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INTRODUCTION 
When one subsidiary in a group of companies is found by 
the European Commission to have engaged in price fixing, 
contrary to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”), the question arises whether the 
parent company of the group should also be fined. This 
question is important because the Commission considers that 
when the parent is fined, the fine can be increased for 
deterrence and based on the turnover of the entire group, even 
if only one subsidiary was involved in the infringement. The ten 
percent limit on the amount of the fine, imposed by Regulation 
1/2003, Article 23, is applied to the group turnover, and not to 
the turnover of the subsidiary. The rule that fines are increased 
for recidivism is applied to the group, and not only to the 
subsidiary. 
The conventional view is that the parent company can be 
fined (even if it was not involved in the infringement) when the 
two companies form part of a single economic “enterprise” or 
“undertaking” (so that, for example, an agreement between 
them would not be regarded as an intra-enterprise conspiracy 
and so not restricting competition). However, because the fines 
on parent companies are so large, this view has given rise to a 
large member of cases before the General Court and the 
European Court of Justice (the “ECJ” and collectively with the 
General Court, “the Courts”). These cases have arisen because 
in practice it is not always clear whether the companies 
constitute a single enterprise. There is no precise and easily used 
definition of an enterprise, and different tests have been 
applied. As a result, it is generally considered by practising 
lawyers that it is not clear what a parent company needs to prove 
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in order to avoid being fined. In the case of a wholly owned 
subsidiary, there is a presumption that the two companies form 
a single enterprise. This presumption is said to be rebuttable 
(and to be legally permissible, it must be rebuttable), but it has 
almost never been rebutted. It is therefore very difficult for a 
parent company to know whether e.g., routine compliance with 
company law would involve it in liability if a subsidiary infringed 
Article 101. This is widely believed to be contrary to legal 
certainty, and to discourage parent companies from kinds of 
conduct that are either desirable or obligatory.1 
So, there are two areas of uncertainty in the law: What kinds 
of evidence are relevant to prove or disprove a “single 
enterprise”, and how can the presumption be rebutted? More 
specifically, what are the key tests of a “single enterprise”? Is it 
possible in practice to rebut the presumption? If it is possible to 
rebut it, what kind of proof is necessary? 
I. THE PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO CASE LAW 
The judgments of the General Court and of the European 
Court of Justice in cases in which parent companies have been 
fined by the European Commission for price fixing by their 
100% subsidiaries now follow a pattern.2 The recent judgments 
repeatedly say: 

1. It may also create an incentive for parent companies to wholly centralize the 
management of their subsidiaries, losing the benefits of local management. See Laura 
La Rocca, The Controversial Issue of the Parent Company Liability for the Violation of EC 
Competition Rules by the Subsidiary, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.  68, 68–76 (2011). 
2. See generally for comments on the recent caselaw, Stefan Thomas, Guilty of a 
Fault that One Has not Committed: The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out 
by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law, 3 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. 
& PRAC. 11 (2012); La Rocca, supra note 1, at 68–76; Mieke Olaerts & Caroline 
Cauffman, Quimica: Further Developing the Rules on Parent Company Liability, 32 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV. 431, 431–440 (2011). Citing primarily recent case-law, see Stora 
Kopparsberg v. Commission., Case C-286/98 P,  [2000] E.C.R. I-9925, ¶ 25; Akzo Nobel 
and Others v. Commission., Case C-97/08 P,  [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 58 ff; Elf 
Aquitaine v. Commission., Case C-521/09 P,  [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 1; Arkema v. 
Commission., Case C-520/09 P,  [2011] E.C.R. I-8901; Elf Aquitaine v. Commission., 
Case C-404/11 P [2012]. Other cases include General Quimica and Others v. 
Commission., Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-00001, ¶¶ 34–35; Cases C-201/09 P; 
Arcelormittal Luxembourg v. Commission. and Commission. v. Arcelormittal 
Luxembourg, C-216/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2239, ¶ 95; Joined Cases T-122/07 to T-
124/07, Siemens AG Österreich and VA Tech Transmission v. Commission. [2011] 
E.C.R. II-0793, ¶¶ 122, 130, 135, 151; Joined Cases T-141/07 and others, General 
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x the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent 
where, although they have separate legal personalities, 
the subsidiary does not decide independently on its 
conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material 
respects, the instructions given by the parent, having 
regard to the economic, organizational, and legal links 
between them. 
x in this situation the two companies form a single 
economic unit and therefore a single enterprise, so the 
involvement of the parent in the infringement does not 
need to be proved. 

Technic-Otis and Others v. Commission., [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶¶ 52–90; Legris 
Industries v. Commission., Case C-289/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); 
ThyssenKrupp v. Commission., Case C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I- 2359; Arcelor Mittal 
Luxembourg v. Commission., Case C-201/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2239 (a former parent 
company); Arkema and Others  v. Commission (sodium chlorate) Case T-343/08,, 
[2011] E.C.R. II-2287; Arkema, Total, Elf  v. Commission (methacrylates), Case T-
217/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2593; Cases T-185/06, 186/06, 196/06, Air Liquide, Edison, 
Solvay  v. Commission. (hydrogen peroxide), [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, 2839, 2959, 3179, 
3149, 3063, 3119; EI du Pont de Nemours  v. Commission, Case T-76/08, [2012] E.C.R. 
I___ (not yet reported); UPM Kymmene  v. Commission (industrial bags), Case T-
53/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Total, Elf Aquitaine  v. Commission, Case 
C-421/11, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Novácke chemické závody a.s. v. 
Commission (calcium Carbide), Case T-352/09, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); 
Nynäs Petroleum v. Commission, Case T-347/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); 
garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported), ¶ 22 
(a case in which the presumption was not applied); Alliance One v. Commission 
(Italian tobacco), Cases C-593/11, C-654/11, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); 
Tomkins v. Commission, Case C-286/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); ENI 
v. Commission (synthetic rubber), Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet 
reported); Parker v. Commission. (marine hoses), Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I___ 
(not yet reported); Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case T-199/08, [2011] E.C.R. II-2149; 
Dow Chemical, Case C-499/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported), ¶ 47–48; 
Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-400; FL Smidth, Case 
T-65/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Total Nederland v. Commission, Case 
T-348/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Fresh Del Monte Produce v. 
Commission, Case T-587/08, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Groupe Gascogne 
v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-____. 
In Arkema and Others, Case T-217/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2593, the Court said:  
[A] parent company which holds almost all of the capital of its subsidiary is, 
as a general rule, in a similar situation to that of a sole owner, as regards its 
power to exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary, 
having regard to the economic, organizational and legal links which join it to 
that subsidiary. Consequently the Commission is entitled to apply to that 
situation the same evidential regime, namely to rely on the presumption that 
the parent company makes effective use of its power to exercise a decisive 
influence over the conduct of its subsidiary. 
Id. ¶ 53. 
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x Where the parent has a 100% shareholding, it can 
exercise a decisive influence on the subsidiary’s conduct, 
and there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent 
does in fact exercise a decisive influence. The 
Commission does not need to show evidence of the 
exercise of influence. It does however need to explain 
that it relied on the presumption.3 Because the 
presumption must be rebuttable, the Commission may 
need to make a detailed statement of reasons for 
imputing the infringement to the parent company4 and 
should explain why the companies’ arguments are not 
enough to rebut the presumption. 
x the parent company has the burden of proof to rebut the 
presumption, by producing sufficient evidence to show 
that the subsidiary acts independently on the market. 
In fact, this presumption has never been directly rebutted.5 
Repeatedly, the Courts have said that evidence and arguments 
put forward by parent companies were not sufficient to rebut it. 
In some cases the Courts have annulled findings that it has not 

3. Grolsch, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169, ¶¶ 77–78. 
4. Air Liquide, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶ 65; Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, 
¶ 153. 
5. In several cases the Courts have refused to apply the presumption, on 
procedural grounds. Procedural issues are not enough to make the presumption 
rebuttable as a matter of substance. Air Liquide, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809; Edison v. 
Commission, Case T-196/06, [2011] E.C.R II-3149; Grolsch, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169; Elf 
Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947; General Quimica v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P, 
[2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶¶ 60–62, 79. These cases are discussed below. The only case in 
which the presumption has been held to be inapplicable on substantive grounds is 
Gosselin v. Commission, Joined Cases T-208–209/08, [2011] E.C.R. II-3639. These cases 
are discussed below. 
Since the liability of the parent is derived from the liability of the subsidiary, it 
cannot relate to a period longer than the period during which the subsidiary was 
committing the infringement.  Tomkins v. Commission, Case C-286/11 P, [2013] 
E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported). 
There have been several cases in which there has been a change in the ownership 
of the subsidiary which committed the infringement, but they do not seem to clarify the 
legal issues discussed here. See Thyssen Krupp Nirosta GmbH v. Commission, Case C-
352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R I-2359, ¶ 143 (“In principle, it is for the natural or legal person 
managing the undertaking in question when the infringement was committed to 
answer for that infringement, even if, at the date of the decision finding the 
infringement, the operation of the undertaking was no longer his responsibility.”); see 
also Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported). 
It seems that the Commission has discretion as to whether to fine a parent 
company. See Team Relocations v. Commission, Case C-444/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____ 
¶¶ 159–161 (not yet reported). 
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been rebutted, but have done so essentially on procedural 
grounds. It seems clear that the Courts allow the presumption to 
be rebutted a little more readily than the Commission, although 
the Courts do not seem to have been consistent. 
In theory, it is because the parent and subsidiary form a 
single enterprise for the purposes of Article 101 that the parent 
can be fined.6 This can be proved either by evidence that the 
parent gives instructions, or by other evidence of various kinds 
showing that there is a “single enterprise” or, in the case of 
100% shareholding, by the presumption that control is 
exercised, unless that presumption can be rebutted. 
After considering some policy considerations and some 
specific issues, these questions are discussed below. 
It is not always clear whether findings in the judgments of 
the General Court are specific findings of fact concerning the 
cases before the Court and if so, on what those findings are 
based, or whether they are intended to be general statements of 
law. The Court of Justice, in theory, does not make findings of 
fact in appeals from the General Court. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Although the Commission has never clearly stated the 
policy considerations that have gradually led to the present state 
of the law, the arguments for making parent companies liable 
for price-fixing by wholly owned subsidiaries seem to be based 
on the following assumptions: 
x the parent company and the group of companies will 
usually be significantly larger than the company involved 
in the infringement, and therefore a larger fine should 
be imposed, to achieve more effective deterrence.7 
x if the parent company is liable and the result is a larger 
fine, the parent will be under pressure to supervise the 
subsidiary more strictly. 
x since the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary has power 
to control the subsidiary, either it has done so (and 

6. EI du Pont de Nemours v. Commission, Case T-76/08, [2012] E.C.R. I____(not 
yet reported). 
7. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 17 (“[I]t is hard to see from what particular 
conduct or omission the parent company should be deterred.”). 
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therefore should share the responsibility for any 
infringement that has occurred) or it has deliberately 
chosen not to do so (and so it should not be allowed to 
escape responsibility). 
x wherever there are reasons for increasing the total 
amount of a fine, it should be increased. 
x the concept of a single enterprise should be the same 
under Article 101 for fining purposes as it is under the 
Merger Regulation, and when dealing with the question 
whether an agreement between associated companies can 
restrict competition. 
The Court has said8 that the presumption that the parent 
exercises influence:  
seeks precisely to find a balance between the 
importance . . . of the objective of penalising conduct 
contrary to the competition rules, in particular Article 101 
TFEU, and to prevent its repetition and . . . the 
requirements of certain general principles of European 
Union law, such as in particular the presumption of 
innocence, that penalties should be applied only to the 
offender, legal certainty and the rights of the defence, 
including the principle of equality of arms. It is particularly 
for that reason that it is rebuttable. 
In the light of the case law, that statement seems unduly 
complacent. 
The first cases involved evidence that the parent company 
had been involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the 
operations of the subsidiary. The Commission gradually came to 
see that it would be simpler and easier if there were a 
presumption that a parent always exercises some control over a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, and could be fined on that basis, 
without any need to analyse the evidence. In other words, the 
development of the cases suggests that the Commission 

8. ENI, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ (delivered May 8, 2013), ¶ 50; Schindler Holding v. 
Commission, Case C-501/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet 
reported) ¶ 108; Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 59; id. ¶ 60 (“[I]t is within the 
sphere of operations of those entities against whom the presumption operates that 
evidence of the lack of actual exercise of that power to influence is generally apt to be 
found.”). 
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gradually moved towards a more easily applied rule that would 
justify higher fines. 
It is useful to set out the characteristics that would be 
needed for a sound and rational policy. Such a policy: 
x should state a rule about parent companies that have not 
in fact been involved in infringements that is clear and 
intelligible to business people, and should avoid as far as 
possible being dependent on the details of the 
companies’ arrangements and practices, because any 
such dependence will lead to endless litigation. 
x would not penalize or discourage efforts by parent 
companies to prevent their subsidiaries from infringing 
the law, in particular competition law.9 A policy that 
discouraged measures to ensure compliance would be 
irrational and counter-productive. So instructions given 
by parent companies to obey competition law ought not 
to make the parent liable to fines. Instructions of that 
kind have no economic content, and do not make 
separate companies into a single economic “enterprise.” 
x should not make it difficult for the parent company to 
comply with any other law applicable. Specifically, it 
should not make the parent liable to fines merely because 
it fulfils its normal obligations as a shareholder to hold 
meetings of shareholders in the subsidiary at intervals. A 
law-abiding shareholder must carry out a number of 
obligations under the company law applicable to the 
subsidiary. 
x should not make it necessary for the parent to choose 
between potential liability to fines and breach of its own 
obligations under the company law and stock exchange 
obligations applying to the parent itself. Those 
obligations require the parent to consolidate the 
accounts of the subsidiary and to make statements about 
the subsidiary for the accuracy and completeness of 
which the parent is legally responsible, and which the 
parent must be able to verify as far as necessary. 

9. See GTO, General Technic, Otis and UTC v. Commission, Joined Cases T-141-
42, 145-46/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 85 (in which the Court considered that 
measures intended to ensure compliance proved control, and made the parent 
company liable); see also Schindler Holding, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered July 18, 2013) 
¶ 114. 
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Consolidation of accounts, and descriptive statements, do 
not have direct economic consequences, and do not 
create a single “enterprise.” 
x should not interfere with good management of the group 
by the parent. Competition law should not penalize or 
discourage a parent from requiring group approval for 
any major financial commitment by the subsidiary. 
Financial prudence should not be enough, in itself, to 
lead to liability to fines. It would not be a wise policy to 
discourage a parent from supervising a subsidiary in 
circumstances when supervision seemed desirable. 
Safeguard measures taken when problems arise are not 
equivalent to routine continuing economic instructions 
and control. There is nothing inherently undesirable 
about close relations between parents and subsidiaries. 
x should not disregard the fact that some multinational 
groups of companies are highly decentralized, and that 
the ultimate parent does not try to exercise anything 
resembling day-to-day management and control. There is 
nothing inherently undesirable about decentralized 
management, either. 
It is not clear, even in theory, what policy principles the 
case law is based on, or what a parent company ought to prove 
in order to avoid liability for an infringement by its wholly-
owned subsidiary. This uncertainty has led to much litigation, 
and the law has not become any clearer. If it were accepted that 
the above tests are relevant in assessing the present state of the 
law, it seems clear that it would fail the tests. 
It is always undesirable in any sphere of law to have a 
presumption that can be rebutted only by proving a negative, 
such as, in these cases, proving that influence was not exercised 
(especially as it is not clear what proof would be sufficient, or 
even precisely what needs to be proved). This basic criticism is 
not answered by saying that in many cases the parent has 
exercised influence and so should not be able to rebut the 
presumption. This is particularly undesirable when the initial 
findings of fact are made by a body such as the Commission for 
which it is convenient to rely on the presumption and to reject 
as insufficient any evidence intended to rebut it. Confirmation 
bias, which inevitably arises when the same officials draft the 
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statement of objections and the decision, is particularly likely in 
these circumstances. 
The need to prove a negative is not easy to reconcile with 
the presumption of innocence.10 That presumption is not made 
inapplicable merely by saying that the two companies are, or are 
presumed to be, part of one group. The two presumptions seem 
incompatible, and one would assume that the presumption of 
innocence, being a fundamental right, should prevail. However, 
this was not accepted by the General Court in Thyssen Krupp11,  
GTO General Technic,12 or Schindler13 on the formal ground that, 
in theory, the presumption of influence can be rebutted. 
III. ACADEMIC COMMENTS 
Lawyers commenting on this case law have almost 
unanimously criticized it, essentially on the grounds that the 
presumption cannot in practice be rebutted, and that it is no 
longer a presumption but, in reality, something close to a rule of 
law.14  

10. See, e.g., Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades v. Commission, Case T-496/07, 
[2013] E.C.R. I____ ¶¶ 180–81 (delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported) (“La 
présomption d’exercice d’une influence déterminante ne saurait être renversée par la 
seule démonstration que c’est la filiale qui gère les aspects de sa politique commerciale 
sans recevoir de directives à cet égard. . . . L’absence d’ordre ou d’instruction de la 
société mère à la filiale en ce qui concerne sa politique d’achat ou les réunions avec les 
autres membres de l’entente n’est pas non plus de nature à démontrer l’autonomie du 
comportement de la filiale sur le marché . . . .”). 
11. Thyssen Krupp and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-144, 147–50, 
154/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-5129. 
12. GTO, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977. 
13. Schindler Holding, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ ¶¶ 81–84 (delivered July 18, 2013) . 
14. See, e.g., Ingrid Vandenborre & Thorsten C. Goetz, Rebutting the Presumption of 
Parental Liability – A Probatio Diabolica?, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
GUIDE TO: CARTELS & LENIENCY 2012, at 17 (Global Legal Grp. ed., 2012); Bettina 
Leupold, Effective Enforcement of EU Competition Law Gone Too Far? Recent Case Law on the 
Presumption of Parental Liability, 34 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 570, 570–82 (2013); Yves 
Botteman et al., “You Can’t Beat the Percentage” – The Parental Liability Presumption in EU 
Cartel Enforcement, 2012 EUR. ANTITRUST REV. 3; John D. Briggs & Sarah Jordan, 
Presumed Guilty: Shareholder Liability for a Subsidiary’s Infringements of Article 81 EC Treaty, 
8 BUS. L. INT’L 1 (2007); Marco Bronckers & Anne Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? 
The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 34 WORLD 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 535, 535–70 (2011); La Rocca, supra note 1; Thomas, 
supra note 2. 
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IV. SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES 
Before considering the main questions arising, several 
specific questions are worth analyzing briefly, because a variety 
of different phrases have been used to describe the tests to be 
applied. 
x the Courts have used phrases about influencing the 
subsidiary’s “conduct on the market.” Presumably it is 
intended to refer to the fact that the infringements 
concern the subsidiary’s pricing policy. But it seems that 
instructions only about e.g., investments or financial 
control, without any instructions concerning pricing, 
would not enable the parent to avoid liability. It is not 
clear whether there can be a single enterprise if there 
were proved to be no exercise of influence on the 
subsidiary’s conduct “on the market.”15 
x what is the significance of phrases about influence “in all 
material respects”? The phrase seems to be repeated 
routinely without having any great significance.16 At first 
sight, the phrase suggests that there might be exercise of 
influence that would be immaterial and that would not 
mean that the parent should be liable. It also suggests 
that if there had been influence only in some material 
respects, the conclusion would not be clear. But neither 
suggestion is borne out by the case law. The Commission 
seems to consider that instructions on any aspect of the 
subsidiary’s affairs confirm, instead of rebutting, the 

15. See Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 177 
(delivered May 17, 2013) (not yet reported) (“[T]he conduct of the subsidiary on the 
market cannot be the only factor which enables the liability of the parent company to 
be established, but is only one of the signs of the existence of an economic unit.”); see 
also  Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-400, ¶ 74 
(holding the parent company can be liable even if its influence does not concern the 
“commercial policy” of the subsidiary). 
16. See, e.g., Gosselin Group NV v. European Commission, Case C-440/11 [2013] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 38 (delivered July 11, 2013) (not yet reported) (citing Akzo Nobel NV v. 
European Commission, Case C-97/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 58; Alliance One 
International Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 628/10 & 14/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 
43 (delivered July, 19, 2012) (not yet reported), and previous case-law) (“[I]t is the 
Court’s established case-law that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the 
parent company in particular where, although having a separate legal personality, the 
subsidiary does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but 
carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, 
having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between 
those two legal entities.” (emphasis added)).   
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presumption. The fact that there are some matters on 
which clearly no instructions have been given (even if 
those matters are “conduct on the market”) does not 
seem to relieve the parent from liability.17 

17. See, e.g., Keramag Keramische Werke AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 379/10 
& 381/10, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 312 (delivered on Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported) 
(“It is not necessary to restrict that assessment to matters relating solely to the 
subsidiary’s commercial policy in the strict sense, such as the distribution or pricing 
strategy. In particular, the presumption in question cannot be rebutted merely by 
showing that it is the subsidiary that manages those specific aspects of its commercial 
policy, without receiving instructions.”). In Groupe Gascogne SA, Case C-58/12, [2013] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 39–43 (delivered Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported), the ECJ found 
that even though the subsidiary enjoyed “a large measure of autonomy,” it was 
nevertheless under regular parental monitoring and this was sufficient to find the 
existence of a single undertaking. In Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades, Case T-496/07, 
[2013] (not yet reported) ¶ 179, the General Court even considered that “l’application 
d’un modèle d’organisation fondé sur une philosophie de delegation maximale aux 
filiales ne constitue pas un element de pruve susceptible de démontrer l’autonomie de 
ces dernières. Au contraire, l’introduction et l’application d’une telle stratégie ou de 
toute autre stratégie de management attestent plutôt l’existence d’un pouvoir de 
contrôle effectrif.” See also Roca, Case T-412/10, [2013] ¶¶ 72–77 (not yet reported); 
Laufen Austria, Case T-411/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 95–98 (not yet reported); Roca 
Sanitario, Case T-408/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 95–98 (not yet reported). In Total 
Raffinage Marketing v. Commission, Case T-566/08, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 501–02 
(delivered on Sept 13, 2013) (not yet reported), the General Court explained its 
position as follows:  
[I]t should be observed that the application of the presumption that the 
parent company owning all or virtually all of the capital of its subsidiary does 
in fact exercise decisive influence over the commercial conduct of the 
subsidiary is justified by the fact that, where the parent company is the 
subsidiary’s sole shareholder, it has at its disposal all the possible means of 
ensuring that the subsidiary’s commercial conduct is aligned with its own. In 
particular, it is the sole shareholder that defines, in principle, the extent of 
the subsidiary’s autonomy by establishing the latter’s articles of association, 
chooses its management and takes or approves the subsidiary’s strategic 
commercial decisions, if necessary by having representatives on the 
subsidiary’s bodies. Likewise, the economic unity between the parent 
company and its subsidiary is normally further protected by obligations 
arising under the company law of the Member States, such as the obligation 
to keep consolidated accounts, the obligation for the subsidiary to account 
periodically for its activities to the parent company and also by the approval 
of the subsidiary’s accounts in general meeting, consisting solely of the parent 
company, which necessary means that the parent company follows, at least in 
broad terms, the commercial activities of the subsidiary. 
 Next, it should be emphasised that in the case of a subsidiary which is 
wholly, or almost wholly, owned by a single parent company, there is in 
principle a single commercial interest and the members of the subsidiary’s 
bodies are designated and appointed by the sole shareholder, which may give 
them at least informal instructions and impose performance criteria on them. 
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x from phrases about “economic, organisational and legal 
links” between the two companies, it seems that the 
Courts consider that all the relationships between the 
parent and subsidiary need to be taken into account, 
presumably because a subsidiary’s conduct might be 
influenced in a variety of different ways.18 That seems 
reasonable, but the phrase provides little useful 
guidance.19 The phrase may merely describe the overall 
closeness, or otherwise, of the relationship between the 
companies. It seems clear, however, in particular from 
the judgments in Air Liquide20 and Elf Aquitaine,21 that the 
economic relationships are more important than the 
administrative, legal, or organizational ones. Sharing a 
legal, tax, and insurance department with the parent 

In such a case, therefore, there is necessarily a relationship of confidence 
between the management of the subsidiary and the management of the 
parent company and the management of the subsidiary necessarily act by 
representing and promoting the only commercial interest that exists, namely 
the interest of the parent company. Thus, the unity of the market conduct of 
the parent company and of its subsidiary is ensured in spite of any autonomy 
conferred on the management of the subsidiary as regards its operational 
direction, which comes within the definition of the parent company’s 
commercial policy in the strict sense. As a general rule, moreover, it is the 
sole shareholder that defines, on its own and according to its own interests, 
the procedure whereby the subsidiary takes decisions and that determines the 
subsidiary’s operational autonomy, which it may change on its own initiative 
by amending the rules governing the functioning of the subsidiary or in the 
context of a restructuring, or indeed by setting up informal decision-taking 
structures.” 
18. See La Rocca, supra note 2. 
19. In the Opinon of Advocate General Kokott, Alliance One, [2012] E.C.R. I____, 
¶¶ 146, 158, the Advocate General said that if the presumption is relied on the links 
must make it appear likely that the parent in fact exercised decisive influence. This 
would mean that the presumption, by itself, would not be sufficient. See also Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 87, 91. Depending on the 
circumstances, an influence over human resources, investment, legal acts, and any 
strategic influence even short of operational management might be relevant. The 
judgment in garantovaná a.s. v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 31 
(delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported), mentioned influencing pricing policy, 
production, distribution, sales objectives, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow, stocks, 
marketing, and coordinating roles. Clearly a parent which influenced such matters 
would be part of a single enterprise. Influence on strategic decision-making is indeed 
sufficient. See EI du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Commission, Case C-172/12, [2013] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 52 (delivered 26 Sept, 2013) (not yet reported). 
20. L’Air Liquide SA v. Commission, Case T-185/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶¶ 67–
80. 
21. Elf Aquitaine SA v. Commission, Case C-521/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 160–
68. 
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company would be compatible with economic autonomy. 
This makes sense. The question is whether the two 
companies form a single economic unit, not an 
administrative unit. 
x does the concept of a “single economic unit” or a “single 
enterprise” add to or clarify the position?22 If the parent 
and the subsidiary are in entirely different product 
markets, as in Air Liquide, it seems meaningless to speak 
of them being a single economic unit. However this 
argument was rejected in Eni.23 The concept of an 
“enterprise” does not seem useful either, since (unless 
the presumption is impossible to rebut) the fact that the 
parent owns the subsidiary is irrelevant. It is not clear 
whether the test is really behavioral, or structural. 
x is the test being applied one which depends on whether 
the parent in fact exercised influence, or is it enough that 
the parent could have exercised influence? If it were 
enough that the parent could have exercised influence, 
the 100% parent would always be liable, unless there were 
contractual or other legal reasons (e.g., insolvency or 
receivership) which made any influence impossible. In 
Eni,24 the Court said that it is “the prerogatives of a parent 
company… which [enable] that parent company, except in 
exceptional circumstances, to exercise decisive influence over the 
conduct of its subsidiary.”25 In previous cases the Courts 

22. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶¶ 88–89, 
93 (“In quite general terms, attribution of conduct as between parent and subsidiary is 
always possible where both form one economic entity, that is, where they are to be 
regarded as a single undertaking; in other words, responsibility under antitrust law is 
attributed to the a parent company in view of the unity of the group thus formed . . . 
instructions are merely a particularly clear indication of the existence of the parent 
company’s decisive influence over its subsidiary’s commercial policy. However, 
autonomy of the subsidiary cannot necessarily be inferred from their absence.”); id. ¶ 
65 (on “economic, organizational and legal links”); see also EI du Pont de Nemours, 
[2012] E.C.R. II-___ (following Akzo, but dealing with a joint venture); Dow Chemical 
Co. V. Commission, Case T-77/08, [2012] E.C.R. II-___ (delivered Feb. 2, 2012) (not 
yet reported). 
23. Eni SpA v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-____, ¶ 65 (delivered 
May 8, 2013) (not yet reported). 
24. Id. ¶ 67. 
25. Emphasis added. As shown by Leupold, supra note 14, the Courts have often 
relied on a mere power to influence in order to find parent companies liable for the 
infringement of their subsidiaries. For example, in HSE v. Commission, Case T-399/09, 
[2013] E.C.R. II-___ , ¶ 99 (delivered Dec. 13 2013) (not yet reported), the General 
Court considered that:  
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had said that it was not the power to influence, but the 
actual exercise of influence, which counts.26 
It is not clear whether the “influence” criterion and the 
“single enterprise” criterion are equivalent, or whether both 
need to be complied with, or whether they are considered 
alternatives, so that the parent would be liable if it either 
exercised influence or could be shown to be part of a single 
enterprise. The better interpretation seems to be that the single 
enterprise concept is the basic concept and is the explanation 
for the “influence” criterion and the presumption.27 In Arcelor 

It is not the content of any instructions that TDR’s supervisory board – 
primarily controlled by the applicant’s representatives – may have addressed 
to TDR’s management that is relevant, but rather the fact that the supervisory 
board and the applicant had detailed knowledge of TDR’s business 
operations and, following discussion, made comments in that respect, 
regardless of whether those comments should be qualified as instructions. 
Such a situation is sufficient (see also paragraph 93 above) to show the 
exercise of control and, consequently, of a decisive influence by the 
applicant, through TDR’s supervisory board, over TDR’s behaviour on the 
market. 
See also Laufen Austria, Case T-411/10, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶¶ 92–93 (not yet 
reported); CEPSA v. Commission, Case T-497/07, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 178 
(delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported), where the Court considered that “le 
simple fait [que la société mère] dispose d’un pouvoir de révocation des 
administrateurs de PROAS, ce qui n’est pas contesté, est susceptible d’exercer sur eux 
une influence déterminante.” The impossibility to rebut the presumption of decisive 
influence if it also entails the possibility to exert decisive influence, and thereby renders 
meaningless evidence of abstention, has been underlined by several commentators, 
including Nils Wahl, Parent Company Liability – A Question of Facts or Presumption?, 19 ST. 
GALLEN INT’L COMPETITION L. F. (June 7–8, 2012). 
26. Some EU cases stated that the Commission cannot impute liability to a parent 
company merely because it is in a position to exercise decisive influence over its 
subsidiary, but must check whether that influence is actually exercised (but not that the 
parent exercised that influence in connection with the illegal conduct). Later 
judgments, however, have eroded this principle. See Kendrion NV, Case C-50/12 P, 
[2013] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported); see, e.g., Stora Kopparbergs Berslaga AB v. 
Commission, Case C-286/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-9925, ¶¶ 27–29; Bolloré SA v. 
Commission, Joined Cases 109, 118, 122, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, & 138/02, [2007] 
E.C.R. II-947, ¶ 132; contra garantovaná a.s. v. Commission, Case T-392/09,  [2012] 
E.C.R. II____, ¶ 29 (delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported) (restating the principle 
that the Commission cannot merely show that the parent was able to exercise decisive 
influence, but must show either by evidence or by relying on the presumption, that it 
did so). 
27. In the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Alliance One v. Commission, 
Joined Cases 628/10 & 14/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, Advocate General Kokott said: 
 According to settled case-law, whether a parent company can be held liable 
for its subsidiary’s cartel offences in fact depends on a single condition only: 
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Mittal, the Court said “where the parent company exercises 
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary, especially 
its anticompetitive conduct, it is the undertaking consisting of 
the parent company and the subsidiary which is liable for the 
infringement.”28 In short, “influence” and “single enterprise” 
should probably be regarded as one test, not two. 
x in several cases the parent companies have argued that 
they are only “holding” companies that do not, and are 
not intended to, involve themselves in the operations of 
their subsidiaries. One would think that this was a 
question of fact in each case. But the Courts have made 
general statements about holding companies which 
would be surprising if they were intended to be 
universally true, either as statements of fact or of law, 
since the phrase “holding company” covers such a very 
wide variety of situations. A “holding company” may be 
essentially passive, and may not be liable for that reason, 
as explained below.29 
x in some cases the parent company has argued that it has 
sought to influence the subsidiary’s conduct only to 
ensure that the subsidiary complied with all the legal 
rules applying to it, including of course competition law 
rules. It seems that this has been treated, by the 
Commission and by the General Court in the Elevators 
case30, as evidence confirming the presumption, and not 
rebutting it. 

The parent company must have exercised decisive influence on the conduct 
of the subsidiary, so that the subsidiary was unable to make independent 
decisions as to its conduct on the market.  
Id. ¶ 144. It does not now seem correct to say that there is only a single condition. 
28. ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v. Commission, Joined Cases 201/09 & 216/09 
[2011] E.C.R. I-2239, ¶ 101. 
29. In Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393, a company 
described as an investment company was held liable for the actions of its 100% 
subsidiary, on the basis of the presumption and several items of evidence relied on by 
the Commission. The parent company received monthly financial reports and an 
annual budget. The Court said that the fact that the parent intended to sell the 
subsidiary might be evidence of a single enterprise, since the parent would wish to 
make the subsidiary more profitable. That would suggest that a conglomerate hedge 
fund would be liable but not a conglomerate holding company. The company appealed 
to the Court of Justice in Case C-50/12 P. See also General Technic-Otis Sárl v. 
Commission, Joined Cases 141, 142, 145 and 146/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 84 
(repeating the factual generalization made in Schunk, [2008] E.C.R. II-2567). 
30. General Technic–Otis, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977. 
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x in some cases the parent company has argued that it has 
never exercised any influence over the normal operations 
of the subsidiary, but that its influence has been limited 
to authorising major financial commitments that the 
subsidiary wished to make. The Courts have not so far 
accepted that the parent has exercised no relevant 
influence in such situations.31 
x A number of factors have been held not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption, but it is not clear whether they 
never could be enough, or whether they were merely 
insufficient or insufficiently proved in the cases in 
question. The factors that have been found insufficient, 
apart from those already mentioned, include the absence 
of interlocking board members.32 More seriously, the fact 
that influence was exercised only on non-operational 
matters was not enough to rebut the presumption.33 
V. THE KEY TESTS OF A “SINGLE ENTERPRISE”: DEGREES OF 
AUTONOMY 
Agreements between companies 100% under the same 
control cannot infringe Article 101 TFEU, since it would be 
unrealistic to try to insist that they should compete with one 
another, and an agreement may merely be equivalent to an 
internal allocation of functions. They are regarded for this 
purpose as a single enterprise. But, that is clearly a different 
question from the issue of liability of a parent company, and 
does not necessarily seem relevant here. 
The difficulty is to identify criteria for deciding whether the 
subsidiary has sufficient autonomy, either generally or in 
whatever respects may be considered relevant, for the 

31. Total and Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case T-190/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-5513; 
ENI v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013) 
(not yet reported) (the subsidiary must be shown to have acted with complete 
autonomy not only at operational but also at financial level). But see L’Air liquide v. 
Commission, Case T-185/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809. 
32. ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs v. Commission, Joined Cases 144/07, 147-
50/07 & 154/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-5129. In garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09, 
[2012] (delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported), the fact that a majority of the 
directors of the subsidiary were appointed by the parent was conclusive proof of 
exercise of influence. 
33. Total and Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. II-5513. 
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companies not to constitute a single enterprise.34 Since no 
criteria have been suggested for this purpose, except the 
unsatisfactory tests of “instructions” (which is clearly only one 
kind of evidence of a single enterprise), it seems better to ask 
whether certain activities should or should not be regarded as 
creating or suggesting a single enterprise, and this approach is 
used below. 
Autonomy, like “full function” in merger law, is necessarily 
a question of degree and not of kind, and a subsidiary may be 
autonomous in some respects and not in others, or more 
autonomous at some times than at others. It is not even clear 
whether it is the behavior of the parent or of the subsidiary that 
should be looked at, or the nature of the relationship, and the 
test of “all the links” between the two companies is not a useful 
one. It would not seem natural to describe companies in entirely 
different product markets as forming one enterprise, but that 
leaves open the question of financial supervision. In Eni,35 
financial influence was said to be enough to make the parent 
liable even though the parent had never been in the subsidiary’s 
market. If it is the closeness of the “general relationship” that 
matters,36 it is not clear how that should be measured or 
assessed. 

34. An enterprise is a “unitary organization of personal, tangible and intangible   
elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long term basis,” regardless of 
how it is financed and of its legal form. HFB and Others v. Commission, Case T-9/99, 
[2002] E.C.R. II-1487, ¶¶ 54, 66. This definition does little to answer the questions 
discussed here. In GTO, General Technic, Otis and UTC, Joined Cases T-141-2/07 and 
145-6/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 54, the Court said “the test is whether or not there is 
unity in their conduct on the market . . . whether two companies . . . . form or fall 
within one and the same undertaking or economic entity adopting the same course of 
conduct on the market.” In Aristrain v. Commission, Case C-196/99 P, [2003] E.C.R I-
11005, ¶ 99 the Court stated that:  
The simple fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies 
is held by the same person or the same family is insufficient, in itself, to 
establish that those two companies are an economic unit with the result that, 
under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be 
attributed to the other and that one can be held liable to pay a fine for the 
other. 
Id. 
35. ENI, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65 (delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported). 
36. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel and Others v. Commission, Case 
C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-08237, ¶ 94. 
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When the issue is whether a joint venture is “full function” 
or not under the Merger Regulation, the distinction is merely 
procedural. But, in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship, 
the question of autonomy is substantive, and may make a great 
deal of difference to the result. Since autonomy is such a 
difficult concept to apply with any degree of confidence, some 
guiding principles are needed. Since these necessitate some 
generalizations about facts as well as law, the Commission is best 
placed to state these principles. It has never done so. 
VI. IS IT POSSIBLE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION? THE 
PROCEDURAL STANDARD FOR REBUTTAL 
The Courts have repeatedly said that the presumption of 
control over a 100% subsidiary can be rebutted. But since they 
have not so far directly accepted that it has been, and they have 
never said clearly how it could be rebutted, these statements do 
not clarify the position.37 The fact that it could be rebutted in 
theory, if that were so, would not be enough if it could not be 
rebutted in practice.38 
The Courts have ruled that parent companies should not 
be held liable, in several cases, on procedural grounds, 
essentially failure to state reasons. However, as shown by B. 
Leupold, the Commission should be able to discharge the duty 
to provide reasons “with ease because the standard imposed by 
the Courts is very low.”39 In General Quimica40 the Court of 

37. The Courts have dismissed applicants’ attempts to rebut the presumption in 
many instances, including in Kendrion v. Commission, Case C-50/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. 
I____ (delivered Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported); Dow Chemical and Others v. 
Commission, Case C-499/11 P,  [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet 
reported); Villeroy & Boch Austria, Case T-373-4/10, T-382/10 and T-402/10, [2013] 
(delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported). Commentators have underlined the 
difficulty or impossibility of rebutting the presumption of decisive influence. See, e.g., 
Thomas, supra note 2; La Rocca, supra note 1, at 68. 
38. The Commission itself has admitted that it might sometimes be appropriate 
not to apply the presumption. For example, in Alliance One International v. Commission, 
Case C-679/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 41–42 (delivered September 26, 2013) (not 
yet reported), the ECJ explained that the Commission had waived reliance on the 
presumption because it did not have enough evidence that the parent in fact exercised 
decisive influence over its subsidiary. See also Alliance One International v. Commission, 
Case C-668/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 42–44 (delivered September 26, 2013) (not yet 
reported). 
39. See Leupold, supra note 14. 
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Justice overruled the General Court. The Court of Justice said 
that the lower Court had simply found that the parent 
company’s order to the subsidiary to cease any practice which 
might infringe competition rules:  
was sufficient in itself to prove that [the parent] exercised a 
decisive influence over [the subsidiary’s] policy, not only on 
the market but also as regards the unlawful conduct. In 
doing that, the General Court limited itself to merely 
asserting a principle, without setting out in a clear and 
unequivocal manner the grounds that led it to that 
conclusion.  
The General Court had also failed to conduct a concrete 
examination of the evidence. The fine on the parent company 
was annulled. 
In Air Liquide,41 the General Court held that the 
Commission had not addressed the arguments put forward by 
the company, and had not set out the reasons why those 
arguments were inadequate to rebut the presumption. They 
could not be regarded as insignificant. They were concrete items 
of evidence. “The Commission’s duty to state reasons for its 
decision on the issue is clearly evident from the rebuttable 
nature of the presumption . . . .  No assessment by the 
Commission of the evidence at issue is apparent from the 
grounds of the contested decision.” In Air Liquide, none of the 
subsidiary’s directors were members of the parent’s 
management board. The subsidiary’s directors had very wide 
powers. The subsidiary had its own commercial, marketing, 
human resources, information technology, and accounts 
departments. It used the parent’s legal, tax, and insurance 
departments, but paid for their services. It leased its offices from 
the parent. It managed several other companies separately from 
the rest of the group. Its activities were very far removed from 
those of the rest of the group. Only the subsidiary’s employees 
took price decisions and initiated large commercial projects, 
decided on its budget, dealt with customer relations, and 
handled relations with the industry federation. There was no 
evidence that the parent gave any instructions to the subsidiary. 
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40. General Química and Others v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-
0001, ¶¶ 60–62, 78. 
41. L’Air liquid, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶¶ 68–80. 
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The Commission had merely said that the company’s arguments 
did not rebut the presumption, without giving any reason, 
except that the parent company had power to appoint the 
subsidiary’s directors. The Court, understandably, said this failed 
to say why the presumption was not rebutted, since the 
company’s arguments “cannot be regarded as insignificant.” The 
Commission should have adopted a position on the company’s 
arguments. The failure to give reasons in the decision could not 
be remedied in the course of the proceedings in the General 
Court. In short, the Commission’s decision was superficial and 
obviously inadequate, and there was ample evidence of the 
subsidiary’s economic autonomy. The subsidiary had neither 
sought or received instructions from the parent, but ran its own 
business without the parent being involved. In Edison,42 the 
General Court annulled the same decision of the Commission 
insofar as it found another parent company liable, again for 
failure to assess the company’s evidence. The General Court’s 
judgment was upheld on appeal to the Court of Justice.43 
In Grolsch,44 the General Court held that the Commission 
had insufficient evidence of the involvement of the company in 
the infringement. 
In Elf Aquitaine,45 the Court of Justice said that because the 
Commission relied on the presumption, it was obliged to 
explain why the company’s evidence was not sufficient to rebut 
the presumption. The Commission is required to do this, in 
order to prevent the presumption from becoming irrebuttable. 
The Commission’s series of simple statements and denials, 
repetitive and unsupported, was not enough. In Elf Aquitaine, 
the Court noted that46 the parent argued that it was only a 
holding company without operational activities, that the 
subsidiary was not under its instructions, did not keep the 
parent informed, did not require approval before making 
contracts, was financially independent, and determined its 

42. Edison v. Commission, Case T-196/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-3149. 
43. Commission v. Edison, Case C-446/11 [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Dec. 5, 
2013) (not yet reported) 
44. Koninklijke Grolsch v. Commission, Case T-234/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169. 
45. Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 144–
70. 
46. Id. ¶ 160. 
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strategy independently. So, the Commission’s series of 
unsupported statements were not enough to rebut the 
presumption. These arguments were similar to those made 
successfully before the General Court in Edison and, indeed, the 
Court of Justice relied heavily on Elf Aquitaine in dismissing the 
Commission’s appeal.47 
In Parker the Court said “the applicants are not required to 
adduce direct and irrefutable evidence of the subsidiary’s 
independent conduct on the market, but, failing that, they must 
submit a body of precise and consistent evidence showing that 
the subsidiary acted independently.”48 This is the closest that the 
Courts have come to explaining the burden of proof, but it is 
not clear what the “precise and consistent” evidence needs to 
prove. 
VII. IF THE PRESUMPTION CAN BE REBUTTED, IN WHAT 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
The judgments of the two Courts, as distinct from the 
Opinions of two Advocates General, have given little general 
indication of the nature of the circumstances in which the 
parent company can rebut the presumption. The question 
whether the presumption has been rebutted is primarily a 
question of fact to be decided by the General Court, against 
which there is normally no appeal to the Court of Justice.49 
Almost the only recent indication is found in a footnote in 
the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Akzo.50 It reads: 
The Commission correctly mentions the following examples 
in this regard: (a) the parent company is an investment 
company and behaves like a pure financial investor (b) the 
parent holds 100% of the shares in the subsidiary only 
temporarily and for a short period (c) the parent company 

47. Edison, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 24–31 (delivered Dec. 5, 2013).  
48. Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 184 (delivered 
May 17, 2013) (not yet reported). However, the Court went on to describe the claims 
made by Parker as “scarcely credible.” Id. ¶ 191. 
49. Legris Indus. v. Commission, Case C-289/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (delivered 
May 3, 2012) (not yet reported). 
50. Akzo Nobel NV & Others v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R I-
8237, ¶ 67. This Opinion and that of Advocate General Warner were mentioned in 
garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 50–52 (delivered 
Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported). 
2014] PRICE FIXING BY A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY 1503 
is prevented for legal reasons from fully exercising its 100% 
control over the subsidiary; see also the examples cited by 
Advocate General Warner in his Opinion in Commercial 
Solvents. . . . 
These examples need to be analysed. It is not clear what 
behaving “like a pure financial investor” would mean in the case 
of a 100% shareholder. A minority shareholder may be entirely 
passive, never exercising its right to vote on any subject. But that 
course of action is not open to a 100% shareholder, which is 
required, by the company law applying to the subsidiary, e.g., to 
arrange and vote at an annual shareholders’ meeting. 
Presumably a “pure financial investor” means a company that 
only holds the shares in the subsidiary in question and does 
nothing to influence the decisions of the subsidiary’s directors. 
But in Arkema, the Court said that showing that the parent is 
“non-operational” may not be enough to rebut the 
presumption.51 
A parent company that intended to hold 100% only 
temporarily, and did so only for a short period, might 
presumably succeed in being entirely passive, depending on 
when it became necessary to hold the shareholders’ meeting. 
A 100% parent company might be “prevented for legal 
reasons” from exercising control if, for example, it had agreed 
that the subsidiary should be managed entirely by another 
company, or if as a result of insolvency, receivership or 
expropriation the control over the subsidiary had been taken 
away from it. If, as may perhaps be true, the presumption can 
only be rebutted if the parent is “prevented for legal reasons” 
from exercising any influence, this possibility may be important 
in determining whether the presumption is permissible in other 
circumstances. 
All three examples given by Advocate General Kokott seem 
relatively unusual, and seem to have little practical relevance. 
There is no record of any of them ever having been relied on 
successfully. 
The Opinion of Advocate General Warner in Commercial 
Solvents in 1974 suggested that an insurance company, or a 

51. Arkema, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 48 (delivered Sept. 29, 2011); see Kendrion, 
Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393 (not yet reported). 
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trustee of a pension fund, might be able to rebut the 
presumption.52 However, in practice such investors hardly ever 
acquire 100% of the shares of a trading company. Advocate 
General Warner seems to have envisaged that such a company 
could be a purely passive investor. He also mentioned the 
situation in which a 100% shareholder might in reality be 
involved in a joint venture in which the other company would 
have the right to control. 
In short, there may be only two kinds of situations in which 
it is clear that the presumption can be rebutted: if the parent 
was a purely passive investor for a brief period or if there was a 
clear legal reason why the parent was legally unable to exercise 
any influence. The first situation is unrealistic in the case of a 
100% shareholder. The second situation is so unusual that it is 
not clear that the presumption could be justified by reference to 
it. 
In these circumstances Gosselin is of interest, although the 
facts were unusual in two respects, and unlikely to be repeated.53 
On appeal from the General Court, the Court of Justice held 
that it was irrelevant that the parent shareholder was a 
foundation (and was therefore not itself an “enterprise”): it 
could still be fined. The Court then held that the General Court 
had erred in law in finding that the presumption had been 
rebutted. The General Court was wrong to hold that the fact 
that the parent had adopted no management decisions during 
the relevant period rebutted the presumption. All the relevant 
factors, not only those resulting from company law, should be 
taken into account. Parent and subsidiary may be a unit on an 
informal basis consisting inter alia of personal links. The entities 
against which the presumption operates are those best placed to 
seek the evidence to rebut it within their own sphere of activity. 
Instead of referring the case back to the General Court, the 
Court rather surprisingly concluded that, as a factual issue, the 
presumption had not been rebutted. 
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52. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 
Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 225, at 262; see Ministero dell’Economia v. Cassa 
di Risparmio di Firenze, Case T-386/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-289. 
53. Gosselin Grp. v Commission, Joined Cases T-208/08 & T-209/08, [2011] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 40 (delivered July 11, 2013) (not yet reported); Commission v. Gosselin 
Grp., Case C-440/11 P,  [2013] E.C.R. II-3639.   
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In the Italian Banking Foundation case the Advocate General 
summarised one aspect of the law concisely.54 “Banking 
foundations will qualify as undertakings for the purposes of 
Community law in two cases: first, if they themselves carry out an 
‘economic activity’ within the meaning of the case law and/or, 
second, if they are directly or indirectly involved in the 
management of undertakings which perform such an economic 
activity.” The Court went on to say that being a shareholder is 
not enough to create a single enterprise “the mere fact of 
holding shares, even controlling shareholdings, is insufficient to 
characterise as economic an activity of the entity holding those 
shares, when it gives rise only to the exercise of the rights 
attached to the status of shareholder or member, as well as, if 
appropriate, the receipt of dividends, which are merely the fruits 
of the ownership of an asset.”55 
Alliance One was a joint venture case, and the Court held 
that one parent was not liable because its shareholding was 
“purely financial.”56 However, it does not seem that a 100% 
shareholding could be regarded in this way, at least not for long. 
On appeal, in Alliance One Advocate General Kokott said 
that the parent company could rebut the presumption “by 
showing that it exercised restraint and did not influence its subsidiary’s 
conduct on the market.”57 But it is not clear how a parent can prove 
that it “exercised restraint” or when the restraint shows that the 
two companies do not form a single enterprise. 
In Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje the ECJ overruled 
the General Court’s finding that the applicant could rebut the 
presumption on the basis that the parent company had not 
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54. Ministerio dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassadi Risparmio di Firenze, 
Case C-222/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-289, ¶¶ 73, 111–12, 117–18. This was a State aid case, 
but the Court in Gosselin considered it to be relevant. 
55. Id. ¶ 111. But see ENI v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 68 
(delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).  
56. Alliance One, Case T-24/05, [2010] E.C.R. II-5329; see Commission Decision 
236/EC, 2007 O.J. L 102/14 (adopted, however, before the law was clarified by the Akzo 
judgment in 2009). 
57. Alliance One International v. Commission, Joined Cases C-628/10 P & C-
14/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 171 (delivered July 19, 2012) (not yet reported). In 
ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v. Commission, Joined Cases 201/09 & 216/09, [2011] 
E.C.R. I-2239, the Court stated that the parent could show that “its subsidiary acts 
independently on the market.” Id. ¶ 98. This suggests that it would be enough to show 
that the subsidiary acted regularly without instructions, as in Air Liquide. 
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adopted any formal management decision during the period for 
which it was held jointly and severally liable for payment of the 
fine.58 The ECJ relied on the informal and personal links 
between the parent and the subsidiary. This extends the 
presumption of decisive influence to personal links between the 
two legal entities.59 
In Total SA, the General Court said with regard to 100% 
subsidiaries “There is in principle a single commercial interest 
and the members of the organs of the subsidiary are chosen and 
appointed by the single shareholder which can give them at least 
informal instructions and impose performance criteria on 
them.”60 As a result, parent companies are left with the difficult 
task to prove that these mechanisms did not operate.61 
It would be unreasonable to criticise the Courts for not 
having given a comprehensive list of situations in which the 
presumption can be rebutted. But the consequences of the 
language used so far are not clear, and it is obvious that it is 
giving rise to a great deal of litigation, which the Courts would 
certainly prefer to avoid. 
The fact that it is so difficult in practice to rebut the 
presumption is convenient for the Commission, which finds it 
very easy to reject the arguments of parent companies, 
sometimes on unconvincing grounds. It therefore seems 
unlikely that the Commission will try to clarify the legal position, 
unless the Courts continue to insist on the Commission giving 
detailed reasons for its conclusions. Institutions such as the 
Commission have an unavoidable tendency to interpret rules to 
suit their own convenience. 
In these circumstances it is not clear how the law might be 
clarified, and it may be useful to consider a new analysis, on the 
lines set out below, under “typical parent companies’ 
situations.” 
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58. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, Case C-440/11 P, [2013] E.C.R.-I___ 
¶¶ 65–68. 
59. In that regard, the General Court considered in HSE v. Commission, Case T-
399/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 76 (delivered Dec. 13, 2013) (not yet reported), that it 
would not have made sense for the applicant to appoint the majority of the members of 
its subisidiary’s supervisory board if they were intended to behave independently. 
60. Translation provided by Author.  
61. Total v. Commission, Case T-548/08, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 41–44 (delivered 
Sept. 13, 2013) (not yet reported). 
2014] PRICE FIXING BY A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY 1507 
VIII. THE DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 
In the series of judgments of the Court of Justice and the 
General Court, the need to analyse precisely the evidence 
intended to rebut the presumption has been stressed. These 
judgments should make it necessary for the Commission to 
develop some criteria for measuring the extent of a subsidiary’s 
autonomy and the weight of the evidence said to show it. The 
language in the judgments seems to imply that the Courts 
considered the companies’ evidence was strong, although the 
character and importance of the evidence may vary depending 
on the specific characteristics of each individual case.62 If the 
Commission does not develop some criteria, much further 
litigation is inevitable. “It all depends on all the circumstances” 
cannot be a satisfactory approach. 
It seems from Air Liquide, Elf Aquitaine, and Edison that the 
Commission will be required to do a better job in future of 
explaining its reasons, in its decisions. It will also be obliged to 
give the companies an opportunity to comment on its reasons, 
during the administrative procedure. The question of the 
liability of a parent company should not be dealt with in a facile 
way, or as an afterthought. The Court now has made it clear that 
the Commission must make the presumption genuinely 
rebuttable, by considering the facts of each case carefully. All of 
the features described in Elf Aquitaine, Edison, and Air Liquide 
are commonly found in groups of companies. The judgments in 
these cases seem clearly to imply that many parent companies 
should be able to show that they only are not part of the same 
single economic enterprise as their subsidiaries, provided that 
they avoid involvement in the subsidiaries’ activities. If the 
Commission is to avoid having further decisions against parent 
companies annulled, it will need to follow proper procedure, to 
deal thoroughly with all the companies’ evidence, and to give 
reasons in detail for its conclusions. These judgments impose a 
stricter burden on the Commission than has been generally 
realised. 
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62.  Akzo Nobel NV & Others v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R I-
8237, ¶¶ 73–74; General Quimica, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 77 
(delivered Jan. 20, 2011) (not yet reported); Elf Aquitaine, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] 
E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 58. 
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To make the presumption genuinely rebuttable, the 
Commission must carefully and objectively consider all the 
arguments and evidence put forward to rebut it. It is not enough 
for the Commission merely to point to one or two factors that 
suggest a single enterprise, as it did unsuccessfully in Air Liquide. 
Clear cases in which all the evidence points in one direction may 
be unusual, and factors pointing in different directions may 
often have to be weighed against one another. The companies’ 
evidence must not be simply brushed aside. This has not always 
been done correctly or consistently in the past, even by the 
Courts.63 The Commission should accept that in cases such as 
Air Liquide the overwhelming weight of evidence is in favor of 
autonomy: if the subsidiary in that case were not autonomous, it 
is hard to imagine a case in which any subsidiary would be. The 
Commission must not give excessive weight to the presumption. 
The Courts will apparently no longer accept superficial 
statements by the Commission. But it is also clear that the Court 
of Justice is reluctant to accept evidence as sufficient to rebut 
the presumption. 
If a parent company can show that it has no involvement in 
the subsidiary’s affairs, as in the cases just summarised, the 
position is, or ought to be, clear. There are, however, a number 
of common situations in which the parent has taken some 
action, even though the action has no economic effects, and 
these situations are considered below. Before doing so, however, 
what seem to be the far-reaching terms of a recent judgment of 
the Court of Justice must be considered. It is not clear whether 
this judgment is consistent with Alliance, Elf Aquitaine, Edison, 
and Air Liquide. 
IX. THE ENI JUDGMENT 64 
The ENI case seems to have made it even more difficult to 
rebut the presumption. The case concerned a cartel involving 
synthetic rubber. The parent company put forward a number of 
factual arguments intended to show that its influence was not 

63. General Quimica, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001; General Technic-Otis, Case T-141/07, 
142/07, 145/07 & 146/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶¶ 82–90. 
64. ENI v. Commissionn, Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 64–68 
(delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported). 
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sufficient to justify it being fined. All of these arguments were 
rejected. The Court of Justice held that the fact that the parent 
company was merely a technical and financial coordinator, 
providing financial assistance and exercising budgetary control, 
was not enough to relieve the parent of liability. It was irrelevant 
that the parent had never operated directly in the chemical 
sector in which the subsidiary was active, and that there had 
been no overlap in the management personnel of the two 
companies. It was enough, apparently, that the parent could 
have coordinated investments, without participating in 
management.65 To rebut the presumption, Eni would have 
needed to show that the subsidiary “could act with complete 
autonomy not only at the operational level but also at the 
financial level.”66 
It was also irrelevant that the parent “did not have 
information on the strategic and commercial plans or on their 
implementation and was not involved in the decision-making 
processes to define strategic and commercial plans or annual 
sales volumes and prices, in so far as they relate only to the 
operational activities in the chemical sector.” 
Eni had argued that “it held only the typical prerogatives of 
a principal shareholder and that the fact of holding them does 
not in itself amount to the exercise of a decisive influence over 
the conduct of the subsidiary.” But the Court said “that the 
presumption of decisive influence rests on the fact that it is 
precisely the prerogatives of a parent company which wholly or 
almost wholly owns its subsidiary which enables that parent 
company, except in exceptional circumstances, to exercise 
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary.” This seems 
to mean that a parent company is fined because it was able to 
exercise decisive influence, whether it did so or not. It seems to 
be implied that “exceptional circumstances” would be situations 

65. HSE, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 76 (delivered Dec. 13, 2013) (holding by the 
General Court, which considered in paragraph 80 that “it is not necessary that the 
former intervene decisively in the latter’s day-to-day management and commercial 
policy stricto sensu . . . the parent company’s influence over the subsidiary’s strategy may 
suffice”); see Dow Chemical Company, Case C-179/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 
(delivered Sept. 26, 2013) (not yet reported). 
66. Butadiene Rubber, [2013] E.C.R. I____,  ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013). 
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in which the parent company had no legal power to exercise 
influence. 
But the Court, nevertheless, went on to say, contrary to the 
impression given by the case law, that the presumption can be 
rebutted:  
Nor does that interpretation of the scope of the 
presumption of actual decisive influence, applied by the 
Commission and confirmed by the General Court, 
transform that presumption into an irrebuttable 
presumption. The fact that it is difficult to prove the 
opposite in order to rebut a presumption does not imply, of 
itself, that it is in fact irrebuttable . . . . 
This judgment certainly suggests that there are very few 
circumstances in which a parent company might be able to show 
that it should not be fined. But it cannot be said that the 
judgment clarifies the legal position in any other respect. It may 
now be useful to consider a number of typical situations in the 
light of the Eni judgment. 
X. TYPICAL PARENT COMPANIES’ SITUATIONS AND ACTIONS 
UNDER COMPANY LAW – A METHODICAL APPROACH 
The objective of a rational policy should not be to fine the 
parent irrespective of how it has behaved, although that is close 
to being the legal position today, at least in the view of the 
Commission. It is therefore useful to consider a number of 
normal situations in which parent companies find themselves. 
XI. IF THE PARENT DID NOTHING 
It must be assumed that a parent company that has never 
done anything cannot be fined. There are several reasons for 
this. A company cannot do less than nothing, so if a completely 
inactive parent could be fined, the presumption would be 
irrebuttable, and every parent company would always be liable. 
Two Advocates General have said that passive companies could 
not be fined.67 The Court’s comment in Arkema68, that it is not 
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67. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237; 
Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Commercial Solvents, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, 
[1974] E.C.R. 223. 
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enough to prove that the parent is “non-operational,” is 
imprecise, and does not seem to apply to a company that has 
never taken any action of any kind. A completely inactive parent 
company cannot have a close relationship with its subsidiary. 
XII. COMPLIANCE WITH MINIMUM OBLIGATIONS OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 
It is not clear, in the light of the comments in ENI and the 
conclusions in Gosselin, whether the mere fact that the parent 
company complies with its minimum obligations as the 
shareholder in the subsidiary is enough to expose the parent to 
fines. If it were enough, the presumption would be impossible to 
rebut, unless there is some legal or contractual obstacle to the 
parent exercising any influence over the subsidiary. The parent 
must be represented at the annual shareholders’ meetings, 
accounts must be approved, and directors and auditors must be 
appointed. This is merely the result of the fact that the parent 
must make sure that it complies with the company law 
applicable to the subsidiary. The parent company would 
certainly risk fines if it appointed an employee or director of any 
other company in the group as a director of the subsidiary, since 
that might be considered to give the parent an economic 
influence. But the parent would presumably be free to appoint 
its own auditors as the auditors of the subsidiary, since auditors 
cannot reasonably be said to exercise an influence on the 
subsidiary’s conduct. In any other context, the parent’s 
compliance with the basic requirements of the subsidiary’s 
company law can hardly be considered as exercising an 
influence sufficient to make the two companies into a single 
enterprise. 
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68. Arkema SA v. Commission, Case C-520/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8901, ¶ 48. In 
Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. I-393, what was described as an 
investment company was held liable, on the basis of evidence of an annual budget, 
monthly financial reports, and evidence of involvement of the parent in the subsidiary’s 
affairs. 
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XIII. COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPANY LAW OBLIGATIONS 
OF THE PARENT 
A third situation is where the parent company does the 
minimum that is required by the company legislation applying 
to the parent company itself. The parent may be required to 
consolidate the subsidiary’s accounts, and to include some 
reference to the subsidiary in its group reports. This means that 
the parent must be able to verify that the statements it is 
required to make are correct, and so it must be free to make 
whatever enquiries are necessary to confirm this. It would be 
unreasonable, and contrary to international comity, to say that a 
parent company that fulfils the requirements of the company 
law applicable to it has exposed itself to fines. If this were 
enough to result in fines, the presumption would be impossible 
to rebut. Verifying the situation is not exercising an influence. 
XIV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARENT UNDER NON-
COMPETITION LEGISLATION 
The fourth typical situation is where the parent company 
does the minimum that is required by other legislation applying 
to it, such as anti-bribery or anti-money-laundering legislation. 
The parent company cannot avoid having to comply with 
legislation of this kind, once it has chosen to operate in the 
jurisdiction in question. Again, the parent company must be 
able to verify that whatever statements it is required to make are 
correct. It would be unreasonable to say that a parent exposes 
itself to fines from the Commission merely because it complies 
with non-competition legislation in its home State. 
XV. STOCK EXCHANGE OBLIGATIONS 
The fifth situation is where the parent company’s shares are 
listed on a stock exchange, normally, but not necessarily, in the 
country where it is incorporated. Being listed is voluntary: a 
company is not legally required to be listed. However, it would 
be unreasonable, to put it no more strongly, to say that a parent 
company has exposed itself to liability for fines if its shares are 
listed on a stock exchange, and it carries out its obligations 
under the rules applicable as a result. These obligations include, 
of course, both the rules of the stock exchange in question itself 
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and the rules resulting from the legislation applicable to quoted 
securities, such as those applied by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. It is hard to imagine that the 
Commission or the European Courts would argue that merely 
complying with stock exchange requirements is enough to make 
the two companies into one enterprise, or to expose a parent 
company to liability. 
XVI. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW 
If, as seems essential, a parent company is free to comply 
with its own legal obligations without exposing itself to fines, it 
must also be free to ensure that its subsidiary complies with 
whatever legal obligations apply to it. It would be irrational to 
expose a parent to penalties for trying to make certain that its 
subsidiary complies with the law. General instructions to obey 
applicable laws, not involving instructions to particular 
subsidiaries (except insofar as they are subject to different 
national legislation) could hardly be regarded as creating a 
single enterprise or as exercising any economic influence of any 
kind that would justify exposing the parent to fines. The Court 
appears to have recognized in General Quimica69 that standard 
instructions given to all the companies in the group cannot be 
regarded as exercising a relevant influence over the economic 
conduct of any particular subsidiary. It would be irrational and 
indefensible if genuine efforts to make everybody obey all 
applicable laws led automatically to liability. It would not only be 
counter-productive, it would also be unjust. But in Schindler, the 
Courts said that “the implementation of [a] code of conduct suggests 
rather that the parent company did in fact supervise the commercial 
policy of its subsidiaries”,70 although instructions to obey the law 
would not normally be regarded as “commercial policy.” 
If this were accepted, it would mean that an antitrust 
compliance program imposed by the parent on all its 
subsidiaries could not be used as evidence of the parent’s 
influence over the pricing policy of any one of them. 
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69. General Quimica, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 101. 
70. Schindler Holding and Others v. Commission, Case C-501/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. 
I____, ¶ 114 (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet reported). 
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XVII. THESE SIX PRINCIPLES 
All of these six principles seem reasonable. None of them 
describe situations in which there would be any reason to 
believe that the parent and the subsidiary necessarily constitute 
a single economic entity or enterprise. However, these 
principles have not been officially stated, it is not clear whether 
they are consistent with the case law (which itself does not seem 
consistent), and it would be very helpful if they were made clear 
by the Commission. 
What is suggested here is that it should be stated clearly 
that actions or situations of these six kinds do not create liability 
for parent companies, since they are entirely compatible with 
economic autonomy. It is not, and could not be, suggested that 
a company that complies with these six principles cannot be 
fined for some other reason. To avoid liability a parent company 
must avoid all actions that lead to liability, not only some of 
them. 
If the parent company is liable in all or most of these six 
situations, the conclusion seems inescapable: the presumption 
cannot be rebutted in practice. If that were so, it would be 
contrary to the European Convention and to the Charter, and to 
the repeated statements of both Courts. 
There is at least one other broad question of great practical 
importance, which needs to be dealt with. That question 
concerns the parent’s financial supervision over the subsidiary. 
XVIII. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
As already mentioned, in Eni the Court said it would have 
to be shown that the subsidiary “could act with complete autonomy 
not only at the operational level but also at the financial level.”71 
Autonomy, however, does not seem to be inconsistent with 
financial reporting. The fact that the parent’s financial 
supervision is limited to receiving financial reports has not so far 
been accepted as showing the subsidiary’s autonomy.72 Indeed 
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71. Butadiene Rubber, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013). 
72. Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, ¶¶ 94–95; Arkema, [2009] E.C.R. II-180, ¶ 53. 
It is not clear whether these were findings of fact in the cases before the General Court 
or general statements about the legal effects of financial reporting. 
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that might perhaps be considered evidence confirming the 
presumption of control, or evidence of a single enterprise. 
Financial supervision may take many forms. One typical 
arrangement is that an investment by the subsidiary involving 
more than a given sum of money must be approved in advance 
by the parent, even if the parent is not giving any form of 
guarantee. The parent’s approval obviously “influences” the 
subsidiary’s conduct: the approval determines whether the 
investment can be made. But, neither the granting nor the 
refusal of the approval has any relevance to the subsidiary’s 
pricing conduct, and there is no obvious reason why the right to 
approve large investments should involve the parent in a risk of 
fines. Nor is there any obvious reason why the power to 
authorise large investments, without more, should create a close 
economic relationship or a single enterprise.73 A bank may need 
to investigate and approve a big investment that it is financing, 
but nobody would say that the bank becomes part of the same 
economic enterprise as the borrower. Financial support, without 
directions, does not create a single enterprise. If the threshold 
for approval is high, the parent is likely to be required by its own 
legal and stock exchange obligations to satisfy itself that the 
investment is appropriate. Even if the parent is not giving a 
guarantee, a large investment by one company in the group may 
significantly affect the price of the parent company’s shares. The 
parent might reasonably decide that an investment of that size 
would be better made in another country, or in another product 
market, or at another time, or on other terms, or in another 
currency. Financial safeguards are not the same as economic 
influence on the subsidiary’s behavior on the market. 
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73. Advocate General Kokott, in Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, said the parent 
company’s influence “as regards corporate strategy, operational policy, business plans, 
investment, capacity, provision of finance, human resources and legal matters” may 
affect market conduct. Id. ¶ 92. In Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011] 
E.C.R. II-400, ¶ 81, the Court said that the parent had authorized investments, and 
approved budgets and pricing decisions, and that the fact that these actions had 
concerned Sectors other than the products involved in the infringement was irrelevant. 
The subsidiary had made monthly reports on its activity, and the Court considered that 
this enabled the parent company to intervene whenever it wished. Id. ¶¶ 83–87, 90. 
The exercise of control by the parent company is compatible with some organizational 
autonomy. Id. ¶ 91. 
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The most common form of financial supervision is regular 
reporting by the subsidiary to the parent. In itself this does not 
involve the parent company in the running of the subsidiary’s 
business. It is true that reports may give rise to questions and 
requests for clarification, but these do not involve the parent in 
day-to-day operations either. A bank might require regular 
reports from a large debtor. Authorization and approval do not 
necessarily mean involvement. 
In short, there may be obvious reasons why some degree of 
supervision is justified and necessary, and no clear reason why its 
exercise should involve the parent in the subsidiary’s conduct in 
any way that should make the two companies into one economic 
enterprise, or make the parent liable to fines. Yet, it seems that 
the Commission has consistently argued that financial 
supervision, without more, is enough to make the presumption 
apply, and to make the parent company liable.74 If minimum or 
normal financial supervision were enough to make a parent 
liable, it would be difficult to say that the presumption was 
rebuttable in practice.75 
These questions concern the situation in which the parent 
is only approving investments. Different issues are raised if the 
parent is otherwise involved in the subsidiary’s affairs. If the 
parent, under the guise of financial control, becomes involved 
in commercial affairs, it is likely to create a single enterprise. But 
the principles ought to be made clear. 
How much difference should it make if the parent company 
gives a financial guarantee? A guarantee might make it more 
likely that the parent would supervise the subsidiary’s financial 
position more closely, in particular if that position worsened for 
any reason. Closer supervision might lead to more frequent or 
more detailed reports, or to more elaborate forecasts or 
projections. But, if closer supervision (with or without a 
guarantee) did not lead to the appointment of a representative 
of the parent to the subsidiary’s board, or some similar 
arrangement or involvement, there is no clear reason why it 
should necessarily lead to a risk that the parent could be fined. 
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74. See, e.g., Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393. 
75. See Leupold, supra note 14. 
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At most, it merely suggests a closer relationship between the two 
companies. 
A variety of other situations can be imagined. If a parent 
company gave instructions that no subsidiary should pay a bonus 
of more than a stated percentage of the employee’s annual 
salary that would be an instruction, but not one suggesting that 
the companies constituted a single economic enterprise. If 
instructions were given to ensure equal pay for men and women, 
or more women on the boards of subsidiaries, that would not 
create a single economic unit either. 
In fact, there is no clear rationale for saying when a parent 
should be liable to fines, if it has not been exercising economic 
influence, or discussing or influencing the pricing conduct of 
the subsidiary. The single enterprise concept is a description, 
not a test. If influencing prices were the test, the fact that the 
parent could have influenced pricing conduct is irrelevant, and 
financial supervision, without more, would not justify fining a 
parent company. The uncertainty into which the law has fallen is 
largely due to the absence of any underlying principle or 
rationale to be used for distinguishing cases in which the 
supervision genuinely constituted evidence that the companies 
were a single economic unit. The fact that a shareholder may 
wish to be reassured that the subsidiary is not getting into 
financial difficulties does not mean that the companies are an 
economic unit in any other way. Unless the case law should 
merely be regarded as the Commission’s efforts to justify higher 
fines, some basic principle is essential.76 
The Commission may say that close supervision gives 
opportunities for influence, and in some circumstances that may 
be so. But, the suspicions of officials are not evidence, and 
companies ought to know what they can and cannot do without 
involving the parent in risk. The present legal position, in which 
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76. In Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, ¶ 
[87-90], Advocate General Kokott said that it is “possible” to attribute the subsidiary’s 
conduct to the parent if both form one economic entity, or if the subsidiary has no 
autonomy, or the parent company exercises “decisive influence over its subsidiary’s 
commercial policy.” A single commercial policy may be inferred from “the totality of 
the economic and legal links between them.” Id. ¶ 91. However, in practice the 
Commission relies on the presumption, and not (or not primarily) on evidence of this 
kind. The Court confirmed that there cannot be an exhaustive list of the “factors 
relating to economic, organizational and legal links.” Id. ¶ 65. 
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not even the six principles set out above have been clearly 
accepted, is difficult to defend. 
Financial supervision is relevant to the question of “holding 
companies.” In Schunk the Court said that the function of a 
holding company is to manage the group of companies “as 
one.”77 That may have been true in Schunk, but since the 
concept of a holding company is imprecise and the phrase is 
used in many different situations, the statement is at most a 
factual generalization, and cannot be a rule of law. It is certainly 
not always correct. The question whether companies constitute a 
single enterprise as a matter of law cannot be answered merely 
by using an imprecise and ambiguous label. 
A company that is financially independent is likely also to 
be economically independent, although financial independence 
is not necessary for economic independence. 
XIX. GROUP STRATEGY MEETINGS 
Another common and well recognized practice in 
multinational groups of companies is to bring together senior 
executives of all the companies to exchange views and discuss 
trends and strategies. The aim of such meetings is not for the 
parent company to give instructions, but to gather ideas. Any 
instructions that might be given would be given to all the 
subsidiaries, not to any individual subsidiary, and would be given 
openly. It is therefore unlikely that, if the parent wished to 
influence the conduct of any particular subsidiary, it would 
choose such an occasion to do so. There does not seem to be 
any clear justification for regarding any conclusions that might 
be reached at such a meeting as the exercise by the parent of 
influence sufficient to make it liable if a subsidiary is 
subsequently fined. 
The Commission may say, of course, that it cannot know 
what might be said informally at such a meeting, and the parent 
might take the opportunity to influence a specific subsidiary’s 
conduct. But it would be impossible for the companies to prove 
conclusively that this had not happened, even if it had not. The 
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77. Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v. Commission, Case T-69/04, [2008] E.C.R. II-2567; 
see also Eni v. Commission (Butadiene Rubber), Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, 
¶¶ 64–67 (delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported). 
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Commission does not conclude that prices have been fixed at a 
trade association meeting, even if such a meeting would give an 
opportunity for price fixing. A meeting of the companies of a 
group which might constitute a single enterprise should not be 
treated with more suspicion than a meeting of competitors. 
However, the Commission may say that if the companies in 
a group meet to discuss strategy or common problems, that 
suggests that the group is seeking a common approach, and is a 
single enterprise, even if it were clear that the parent never gives 
instructions. This view would seem reasonable if all the 
subsidiaries were in the same product market, but not if they 
met only to discuss e.g., climate change, or the use of 
information technology. The essential question seems to be 
whether each subsidiary is economically independent (and 
perhaps financially independent), not whether the subsidiaries 
sometimes pool ideas on technical or non-economic matters. 
It is perfectly possible for some subsidiaries to be 
independent and others part of a single enterprise e.g., because 
one subsidiary is only recently established, or is in a different 
product market from all the others, or because the parent 
company has involved itself in the activities of only one of the 
subsidiaries. 
XX. IF THE PRESUMPTION COULD NOT IN PRACTICE BE 
REBUTTED, WOULD IT BE ILLEGAL? 
It seems that two broad interpretations of the case law are 
possible. The interpretation tentatively suggested here is that in 
theory it is possible to rebut the presumption, although it is not 
clear in what circumstances. The other interpretation is that the 
only circumstances in which the presumption can be rebutted 
are situations in which, for legal reasons, the parent company 
could not have exercised any influence. This second 
interpretation is suggested by Eni, and would seem to be correct 
if the parent company would be liable in all six typical situations 
described above. 
The fact that the parent company cannot be fined if it 
could not have exercised any influence cannot legitimise the 
presumption. A presumption that can be “rebutted” only in 
circumstances in which it could not apply can hardly be 
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described as rebuttable. But if in every case in which a parent 
company proves that it did not exercise influence in some 
respects, it is said to have influenced (or to have been able to 
influence) the subsidiary in another, the presumption certainly 
seems to be irrebuttable in practice, in spite of what the Courts 
have said. That is why the six typical situations seem important. 
If a presumption that is justified as a rule of evidence 
becomes irrebuttable without a legislative basis, even if there are 
some exceptions to it, it is illegal because it is contrary to the 
rights of the defence. A company cannot protest against an 
absolute duty imposed by valid legislation, but if a rule is merely 
one of evidence, there must be a right in practice as well as in 
theory to defend oneself by producing contrary evidence. 
So if in practice the presumption cannot be rebutted, it 
seems clear that it would be illegal. Advocate General Mazak in 
General Quimica said that the judgment of the ECJ in Akzo 
“underscored the rebuttable nature of the presumption . . . .  To 
have found otherwise would, in my view, lead to a breach of 
fundamental rights. The rebuttable nature of the presumption is 
necessary in order to guarantee the rights of the defence and 
access to justice of the parent company.”78 The Court in Elf 
Aquitaine, Edison, and Air Liquide has said that the Commission is 
legally obliged to ensure that the presumption is rebuttable in 
practice.79 The Court in Groupe Gascogne repeated that the 
presumption can be rebutted.80 
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78. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak, General Quimica and Others v. Commission, 
Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 34. This view was confirmed by the Court in Elf 
Aquitaine v. Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 59, 62, and in 
General Quimica v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 52. In Elf 
Aquitaine the Court referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Janosevic v Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Reports 2002-VII, ¶ 101ff (July 23, 2002). Elf 
Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 62. 
79. In Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, the Court said that the Commission is 
bound, in order to avoid making the presumption irrebuttable, to explain its reasons 
for saying the evidence is not enough to rebut it. Id. ¶ 153. In Air Liquide v. Commission, 
Case T-185/06, [2006] E.C.R. II-2809, the Court stated that “[t]he Commission’s duty 
to state reasons for its decision on this issue is clearly evident from the rebuttable 
nature of the presumption.” Id. ¶ 75. The same phrase is used in Edison v. Commission, 
Case C-446/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ (delivered Dec. 5, 2013) (not yet reported). 
80. Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-____ (delivered 
Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported). 
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A presumption that in practice cannot be rebutted is a rule 
of absolute liability. A rule of absolute liability, if it would be 
permissible under the Charter and the European Convention 
on Fundamental Rights, would be legal only if it was clearly 
stated in legislation on the basis of sufficient reasons. It has not 
been stated in any EU legislation.81 
The fact, if it were the fact, that there are a few extreme or 
unusual cases in which the presumption would not apply would 
presumably not be enough to make the presumption legal, if in 
most situations it could not be rebutted. 
CONCLUSIONS—LEGAL CERTAINTY AND LITIGATION 
It is widely believed by practising lawyers that the present 
position is contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Insofar as 
relevant, that principle says that European law rules should be 
clear enough for a private party, having taken legal advice if 
necessary, to know with some confidence what it may or may not 
lawfully do.82 In the context of parent company liability, the 
question is whether the parent company can know whether a 
given relationship with its subsidiary would involve it in a risk of 
fines if its subsidiary were fined. Plainly, the law does not now 
enable a parent company to know that. It is not clear whether 
the principle of legal certainty requires that a private party 
should know whether and when it will be liable to a fine for an 
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81. See Bronckers & Vallery, supra note 14. 
82. See, e.g., Flintan Duff and Others v. Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland, 
and the Attorney General, Case C-63/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-569, ¶ 20; Ireland v 
Commission, Case C-199/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-8027, ¶ 69; Thyssen Krupp Nirosta, Case 
C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2359, (“[T]he principle of legal certainty requires that 
such rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations 
which are imposed on them and that those persons must be able to ascertain 
unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly.”); 
Heinrich and Other v. Commission, Case C-345/06, [2009] E.C.R. I-1659. The 
European Court of Human Rights has ruled that: 
In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of 
law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the 
Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in 
terms of an unfettered power. Consequently the law must indicate with 
sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent 
authority and the manner of its exercise. 
Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, Case C-4158/05, E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 76–77 
(delivered Jan. 12, 2010) (not yet reported). 
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infringement committed by another legal entity. It does not 
even seem to ensure that a company must know how much it is 
itself likely to be fined for a given infringement, except within 
very broad limits. But it seems clear that the principle of legal 
certainty means that a company should be able to know what it 
needs to prove in order to rebut a presumption applying to it, 
which has serious consequences if not rebutted. Saying that the 
company is free to produce any evidence sufficient to rebut the 
presumption is not enough. 
The unanswerable argument against the present state of the 
law is that it is generating a great deal of litigation which is 
occupying too much of the time of both the General Court and 
the Court of Justice. Adoption by the EU institutions of at least 
some of the principles set out above, including a clear statement 
on the question of financial supervision, would greatly reduce 
the scope for further court cases. It is true that if no specific 
effort is made to clarify the substantive rules, the Courts’ 
increasing insistence on procedural requirements may gradually 
clarify the substantive principles. But this would be slow, 
cumbersome and expensive. It now also seems that it would be 
damaging for the reputation of the Commission. The judgments 
in General Quimica, Air Liquide, Edison, Elf Aquitaine, and Eni 
require a new approach. 
It is particularly important that the law should be clarified 
because the Court of Justice, in order to save time and speed up 
its work, has taken to dismissing the appeals of parent 
companies by Orders without hearing oral argument and 
without giving reasons that give guidance to the General Court, 
to the Commission, or to companies.83 This practice, while 
understandable, is clearly undesirable. 
Clarification of the legal principles is also necessary to avoid 
one unfair anomaly that results from the case law. Because it is 
not clear what a parent company needs to prove, or what it 
would be sufficient for it to prove, a parent company can now be 
told that it has not made its argument precisely enough for it to 
be admissible procedurally. 
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83. E.g., Total and Elf Aquitaine, Case C-495/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (delivered 
Sept. 13, 2012) (not yet reported); United Technologies, Case C-493/11 P, (delivered  
June 15, 2012) (not yet reported). 
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The Commission, which has created this unsatisfactory 
situation, should overcome the temptation to try to fine parent 
companies in as many circumstances as possible, and take 
effective steps to clarify the law and to reduce the volume of 
unnecessary litigation. A constructive step of this kind is now 
overdue. As the supposedly-rebuttable presumption is based 
only on case law, the Court of Justice could take such a step at 
any time. The Commission could, if it chose, state the principles 
suggested above, and commit itself to apply them. That would 
not be sufficient to resolve all the issues, but it would do much 
to avoid litigation which the Commission cannot regard as 
useful or productive. 
The Commission is not well equipped for assessing the 
economic links between parent and subsidiary companies. Few 
Commission officials have training as judges, or experience of 
private industry or of the practice of law. Even if the rules that 
the officials should be applying were clear, they would not find it 
easy to apply them satisfactorily. But the Court is right to insist 
that the Commission should give reasons for its conclusions. 
Reading all the judgments, one gets the impression that the 
Court is trying to restrain the Commission, by insisting that the 
presumption must genuinely be rebuttable, and by insisting, not 
yet entirely consistently, that the Commission’s decisions must 
be fully reasoned. If the Court finds it necessary to be stricter, or 
if the Commission makes an effort to clarify the criteria in order 
to minimise litigation, the situation may yet improve. 
Advocate General Nils Wahl is reported as having said at 
the Fordham Antitrust conference in 2013 that it is misleading 
to refer to a presumption, and more accurate to refer to a rule 
of law that parent companies are responsible for the actions of 
their subsidiaries. He said that the Court should resolve the 
conflicting judgments. 
The need for clear and intelligible principles concerning 
the liability of parent companies is especially great because of 
two basic and well-known flaws in the Commission’s procedure. 
First, the statement of objections and the decision are written by 
the same officials: the case is not looked at objectively. It is 
especially undesirable and inappropriate that the same 
Commission officials weigh the evidence intended to rebut the 
presumption. Second, the ultimate decision is adopted by the 
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Commissioners, none of whom have read the evidence, heard 
the arguments, or attended the hearing.84 Because of the basic 
unfairness of the Commission’s procedure, it is particularly 
unsatisfactory that the Commission has brought about a 
situation in which parent companies that nobody suggests were 
involved in the infringement are fined on a basis that cannot be 
explained satisfactorily, even after so much litigation. 
Under the “Community method” of legislating, the 
Commission has the exclusive right to propose new measures for 
consideration. There are good reasons for this, but it has the 
disadvantage that, if a desirable reform or clarification would 
inconvenience the Commission, it is unlikely to be proposed. 
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84. See John Temple Lang, Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the 
European Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 1/2003, in CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 219 (Carl 
Baudenbacher ed., 17th St. Gallen Int’l Competition Law Forum 2010, 2011). 
